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In Marco Stier’s article “Normative
preconditions for the assessment of mental
disorder,” the concept of the norma-
tive occupies a central role (Stier, 2013).
Stier states that mental disorders have
an irreducible normative element built
in, expressible through various “norma-
tive frames of reference” they are tied to.
Following his two main theses, he thinks
that these frameworks shape what counts
as deviant as well as non-deviant behav-
ior. He takes this as evidence that we have
to specify mental disorders at the mental
level, and thus will never be able to give a
purely physical account of them.
Unfortunately, he nowhere makes clear
what he takes to be the content of the con-
cept of the normative, although he gives
some hints about his understanding at
various passages. In what follows, I will
explore three of his implicit suggestions
on the essential linkages his concept of
the normative bears to other concepts: the
non-natural, the non-objective, and the
relative. I shall argue that it is question-
able that this understanding leads to the
conclusion Stier aims at—that the spec-
ification of mental disorders cannot be
succeed on the physical but only the men-
tal level due to the impact of normative
considerations in this enterprise.
THE NORMATIVE AND THE
NON-NATURAL
Regarding the relationship between the
normative and the non-natural, Stier
argues that the normative cannot be
grasped in naturalistic terms. Integrating
this alleged fact into his ontological
dichotomy between the mental and the
natural, it follows for him that the
normative must belong to the realm
of the mental, for “[t]here seems to
be something peculiar about behavior
that is beyond purely physical explana-
tion because the difference between, say,
acting kindly and unkindly can hardly
be grasped in physical, non-normative
terms” (p. 1).
Both thoughts appear to be problem-
atic. With respect to the first, there is a
whole bunch of philosophers out there
that intend to explicate all kinds of nor-
mative facts related to human behavior
in naturalistic terms, therefore reducing
the normative to the natural. What Derek
Parfit calls “Analytical Naturalism” (cf.
Parfit, 2011, p. 295) precisely aims at re-
defining normative notions in terms of
natural notions. Parfit mentions Nicholas
Sturgeon and Frank Jackson as promi-
nent proponents of this type of naturalism
(Parfit, 2011, p. 365).
Whether these people are right or
wrong is certainly subject to discussion,
but their efforts at least suggest that tak-
ing phenomena at face value and not
even mentioning competing accounts can
hardly be the adequate strategy. Indeed,
Stier himself gives a prominent example
of a prima facie irreducible ontological
domain besides the physical: The men-
tal itself is often seen as an important
challenge for the hard-boiled naturalist.
Nevertheless, Stier grants (at least for the
purpose of his paper) that “every sin-
gle aspect of our mental and behavioral
life could be explained in purely physical
terms” (p. 2)—from which he of course
explicitly excludes mental disorders. But
if the vast majority of mental phenomena
could be explained in natural terms—why
should not the same be possible for nor-
mative ones?
Secondly, there seems to be no intuitive
way formarrying the fact that something is
non-natural with the fact that it is mental.
A great many deal of things that may serve
as paradigmatic examples for non-natural
entities are not perceived as necessarily
being mental in the way that is of interest
here: God, the number seven, or human
dignity—the latter being clearly a norma-
tive idea. God, for instance, is almost by
definition non-natural, but his concept
surely does not demand from us that he
has to be imagined as something mental.
Indeed, that a certain normative entity
cannot be grasped in natural terms does
not mean that it has to be reducible to
any other domain at all. Alternatively, the
normative aspects of mental disorders that
prove not to be analyzable in natural terms
can be just that—irreducible normative
aspects. For large parts of the normative
domain, this is a common option. Russ
Shafer-Landau, for example, argues that
we should “introduce into our ontology
a sui generis category of values” that can
explain the normativity found in morality
(cf. Shafer-Landau, 2003: 55). If one suc-
ceeds in providing a similar account for
the normative aspects of mental disorders,
there is no need to suppose that mental
disorders have to specified at the mental
level.
THE NORMATIVE AND THE
NON-OBJECTIVE
Let us consider next the non-objective.
When analyzing the various sorts of nor-
mative frames of reference, Stier frequently
uses his assumption of a certain fact’s
being normative as a reason that is must
be non-objective.
I will confine myself to two examples.
When investigating evaluations of ratio-
nality and their bearing on the attribution
of mental disorders, he states that “[i]t
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is [...] a matter of normative choice and
not one of objective judgment whether
rationality is regarded as a component of
mental health or not” (p. 4). Since we
often use irrational behavior as an indica-
tor for the presence of a mental disorder,
the attribution of the latter, if based on
the former, also becomes a non-objective
judgment.
One of Stier’s arguments for this ver-
dict is based on the general observation
that one and the same person can be
subject to a different treatment by others
and the authorities, depending on whether
a certain irrational behavior by her is
regarded as due to a mental disorder or
not. Thus, according to Stier’s “Switching-
Standard-Thesis,” judgments of rationality
are not an “objective” standard for mea-
suring one’s mental health.
But this argument fails, for all Stier’s
observation shows is that depending on
the supposed source of the irrational
behavior (which might be subject to an
argument from the best explanation), our
reaction varies: If we have reasons to
think that the person’s irrational behav-
ior is due to a psychological urge she
does not recognize as part of her own
personality, we are rightly more eager to
intervene. Therefore, it is not as if the
normative judgment about the person’s
rationality does change its validity from
“true” to “false,” or as if the fact that she
behaved irrational is somehow ontolog-
ically dependent on subjective elements;
the change is only in the practical reasons
both provide us with. And we have heard
no argument that these reasons are not
objective, only that their content depends
on further considerations whose status is
yet unclear.
Stier discovers an analogous fault when
moral considerations are used for the
assessing of mental health: “I do claim
[...] that many conditions [of psychi-
atric disorders]—or conditions in many
circumstances—at least involve (morally)
normative elements and thus cannot be
purely value free, non-normative (objec-
tive) medical kinds” (p. 5).
Stier’s assumption that many kinds of
mental disorders have a moral evaluation
built in and are thus not “objective”
in the sense of “out there indepen-
dently of our subjective evaluation”
seems to confuse people’s opinions
about the right morality with morality
itself. He writes, for instance, that
“[i]n a strictly religious society being
an atheist may be seen as a dysfunc-
tion of personhood” (p. 5). True – but
unless one subscribes to a flat sub-
jectivism of the form “thinking that
something is right makes it right,” opin-
ions about morality are not necessarily
true. Consequently, a diagnosed mental
disorder partly based on observed moral
misbehavior might be just false instead
of arbitrarily (but nevertheless correctly)
attributable.
THE NORMATIVE AND THE RELATIVE
Finally, I want to take a look at Stier’s
assumed relationship between the norma-
tive and the relative. He uses the con-
cept of the relative at various places
and cites it as evidence that the value
laden nature of mental disorder cannot
be regarded as open to a purely natu-
ral analysis of the former. In sum, he
states that “[p]sychiatry is guided by social,
moral, cultural and other norms. If this
is true, and if it is also true that these
kinds of norms are relative to time and
place, then psychiatry cannot claim to
know what a mental disorder is “in itself,”
where normality ends and mental disorder
begins” (p. 3).
One passage where he substantiates this
last quotation is his explication of the
influence of cultural relativity for what
counts as mental disorder. He distin-
guishes a direct from an indirect form
of this influence. The former refers to
the “cultural setup” of a society that cre-
ates norms its individuals have to follow.
Depending on their personality, individ-
uals might find it very difficult to cope
with the expectations expressed in these
norms and thus receive higher scores on
certain criteria for specific psychological
disorders.
That the frequency of the occurrence
of psychological disorders correlates with
cultural character and personality is hardly
surprising and “relative” only in the most
uninteresting sense of the term. It is
a well-known fact that water’s boiling
point is dependent on a number of fac-
tors, including air pressure. This does
not prevent it from being a perfect nat-
ural as well as objective fact so far. And
neither cultural character nor personality
is something that can be influenced at will
by the individual to any degree relevant for
most psychological disorders. Following
this reasoning, Stier’s demand that psy-
chological problems have to be “all the
same around the world” to receive a sci-
entific explanation (cf. p. 7) is far too
exaggerated.
With “direct influence,” Stier points to
the thesis that culture characteristics may
not only trigger the development ofmental
disorders in people with certain personali-
ties; it also “tends to dictate the boundary
between the normal and the deviant on the
basis of the expected values and virtues of
its members” (p. 6). Again, the example
Stier uses makes only sense when assuming
that there is no way to evaluate the crite-
ria put forward for mental disorder in a
given culture in terms of their appropriate-
ness. That “[s]omebody who is “dynamic”
in one cultural region may be regarded
as offensive in another” (p. 7) just does
not tell us whether she indeed should be
regarded as offensive.
Stier thinks that there exists no “final
answer” to this question, stating that dif-
ferent models of explanation in psychol-
ogy all constitute “a basic explanatory
norm” for determining what a mental dis-
order is. Thus, “there just is no higher level
of objectivity from which we could assess
the validity of one explanatory account or
the other” (p. 7). To justify this bold the-
sis, he argues that even seemingly “hard”
criteria such as the “effectiveness of an
explanation and its respective therapies”
cannot provide us with a solution, since
which of the competing models of expla-
nation “are the most effective ones is open
to debate even today” (p. 8). However, the
fact that a debate is still in an ongoing state
as such is no legitimate criterion for think-
ing that it never can be closed via rational
exchange, as proponents of the argument
from relativity already admitted 30 years
ago (Mackie, 1977, 36f.).
In sum, seeing mental disorders as
having certain “normative aspects” does
neither have to mean that they are only
explicable at the level of the mental,
nor that they cannot be stated objec-
tively, nor that they exist or are recog-
nizable only relative to cultural norms.
The failure to provide a throughout
“natural” characterization of them may be
completely compatible with the view that
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they are, as Stier puts it, “out there” and
have to be discovered rather than con-
strued. And inasmuch not every normative
aspect may be in need of being reducible to
the natural, the mental, or anything else,
nothing might be lost in translation.
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